{"id":3693,"date":"2021-04-21T19:25:42","date_gmt":"2021-04-21T19:25:42","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/uncategorized\/7-3-i-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-tis-maltas-tou-augoustou-1942\/"},"modified":"2021-06-24T19:08:27","modified_gmt":"2021-06-24T19:08:27","slug":"7-3-i-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-tis-maltas-tou-augoustou-1942","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/7-3-i-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-tis-maltas-tou-augoustou-1942\/","title":{"rendered":"7.3 The Malta supply operation of August 1942"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cFollowing the failure of the\u00a0<\/span>Malta<\/span>\u00a0supply attempt of June 1942, in July only the minelayer\u00a0HMS<\/b><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>WELSHMAN\u00a0<\/span><\/b>succeeded\u00a0<\/b>to escape from the watch of the enemy aeronautical forces and execute a single trip and transport a few hundred tons of supplies.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, given the absolute need to send supplies to the island nad in spite the catastrophic results of the June operation\u00a0[see: \u201cThe\u00a0<\/a><\/i><\/span>Malta<\/span><\/i>\u00a0supply operation of June 1942\u201d ],\u00a0<\/span><\/i>the British decided to repeat it in August 1942.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"HMS WELSHMAN<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, because they ignored that the main force of the Italian Fleet was almost immobilized because of lack of fuel, they abandoned the idea to supply from East and concentrated all available naval and air forces to escort a convoy from England, through the Gibraltar Strait.<\/p>\n

The convoy was formed by 14 cargo ships and was protected by 2 battleships, 4 aircraft carriers, 7 cruisers and 25 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a0These ships crossed\u00a0Gibraltar\u00a0in groups between August 9 and 10 and at dawn of August 11, the various groups reunited south of the Balearides and headed towards\u00a0Cape Bon<\/strong>\u00a0of\u00a0Tunisia.<\/p>\n

The Italians were informed in time of the presence of the convoy and because of the power of the protecting force, it was necessary to use against her the entire main force of the Italian Fleet.\u00a0\u00a0This was however impossible because of shortage of fuel.\u00a0\u00a0They therefore decided to organize an attack with all available light naval units and a few cruisers, on one hand and with air forces, on the other.\u00a0\u00a0They took the following measures:<\/p>\n

Italian and German submarines were deployed between the Balearides and\u00a0Tunisia, while another group of submarines gathered NW of Cape Bon where they would operate in cooperation with bombers.\u00a0\u00a0A series of provisional mine fields was laid near\u00a0Cape Bon.\u00a0\u00a0Torpedo boats would converge along the length of the course of the convoy, between\u00a0Cape Bon\u00a0and\u00a0Pantelleria<\/strong>. Finally, a force of 6 cruisers (3 heavy and 3 light) and 11 destroyers would be standing by to intervene south of Pantelleria, to complete the destruction that all the other measures were to bring.\u00a0\u00a0However, as we will see later, this last force was strangely recalled for reasons that even if they can be considered well-founded, could have in any case been foreseen.\u00a0\u00a0As far as the rest of the Italian measures are concerned, they have proved very successful.<\/p>\n

At dawn of\u00a0August 11, 1942, a first attack of an Italian submarine against an aircraft carrier was executed with unknown results.\u00a0\u00a0In the afternoon, a German submarine had a bright success sinking the aircraft carrier\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>EAGLE<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\"\"HMS EAGLE<\/strong><\/p>\n

On the night of the same day, an Italian submarine attacked with unknown results the\u00a0aircraft carrier\u00a0HMS<\/b><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>FURIOUS\u00a0<\/span><\/b>that\u00a0<\/b>after her aircrafts had flown to\u00a0<\/span>Malta<\/span>\u00a0was returning to\u00a0<\/span>Gibraltar<\/span>.\u00a0 The destroyer that was escorting the aircraft carrier sunk the submarine with all hands on board.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"HMS INDOMITABLE<\/strong><\/p>\n

Air attacks against the convoy started the morning of August 12, south of\u00a0Sardinia.\u00a0\u00a0During these attacks, the aircraft carrier\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>INDOMITABLE,<\/strong><\/p>\n

the supply ship\u00a0Deucalion<\/strong>\u00a0and 1 destroyer that was hit by a torpedo plane suffered damages.\u00a0 The destroyer was abandoned the following day and sunk by its crew.\u00a0 The submarines that were patrolling NW of Cape Bon unsuccessfully attacked the convoy in the afternoon.\u00a0 A British destroyer sunk one of the submarines.<\/p>\n

At around\u00a019:00\u00a0of August 12, as usual, the main part of the British force reversed course towards\u00a0Gibraltar, while the remaining convoy continued its course towards\u00a0Cape Bon.\u00a0 This time however the near escort was more powerful than usual, consisting of 3 cruisers, 1 small antiaircraft cruiser and 10 destroyers.\u00a0 Until that moment from the 14 supply ships, 13 were unharmed and only\u00a0Deucalion\u00a0<\/strong>that had been bombed was following at a distance escorted by a destroyer.<\/p>\n

After a while, 2 Italian submarines attacked the convoy near Cape Bon, launching 4 torpedoes each.\u00a0 The attack was extremely successful: the cruiser HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>NIGERIA<\/strong>,\u00a0<\/strong>the antiaircraft cruiser and 2 cargos\u00a0\u2013<\/strong>the\u00a0<\/strong>Ohio<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>and the\u00a0Brisbane<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Star –<\/strong>\u00a0were hit.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>CAIRO\u00a0<\/strong>sunk and the\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>NIGERIA\u00a0<\/strong>sailed at low\u00a0speed towards\u00a0Gibraltar\u00a0escorted by 2 destroyers.<\/p>\n

\"\"HMS NIGERIA<\/strong><\/p>\n

The 2 cargo ships were immobilized and were abandoned by their escort, but later after light repairs sailed by their own.\u00a0 These simultaneous hit had however a more general repercussion on the cohesion of the convoy. \u00a0For quite a while, half of the escorts were busy dispensing help to the ships that were hit. The\u00a0HMS NIGERIA\u00a0<\/b>and\u00a0HMS<\/b><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>CAIRO\u00a0<\/span><\/b>were the only units that disposed a control center for friendly fighters.\u00a0 Finally, the\u00a0HMS NIGERIA\u00a0<\/b>being the flag ship\u00a0<\/b>disposed of communications means that didn\u2019t the destroyer on which the Admiral commanding the convoy boarded, after she sunk.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"HMS CAIRO<\/strong><\/p>\n

Not much later, at around\u00a0<\/span>20:30<\/span>\u00a0an air attack followed of bombers and torpedo planes.\u00a0 2 cargo ships were hit, the one by submarines and the other by a torpedo boat.\u00a0 Then, a submarine torpedoed the cruiser\u00a0HMS<\/b><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>KENYA,\u00a0<\/span><\/b>but the later succeeded to continue its course.\u00a0 At around\u00a0<\/span>21:30<\/span>, torpedo planes sunk the cargo ship\u00a0Deucalion\u00a0<\/b>that was lagging behind the convoy, because of the damages that the previous bombing had caused.<\/span><\/p>\n

At around\u00a0<\/span>midnight<\/span>\u00a0of August 12 to 13, the remaining ships of the convoy that had been dispersed passed by\u00a0<\/span>Cape Bon<\/span>\u00a0and entered the area in which 18 torpedo boats were patrolling.\u00a0 It was then demonstrated how successful these small units can become in areas such as the Sicily Straits, weather conditions allowing of course their use.\u00a0 2 Italian torpedo boats sunk the cruiser\u00a0HMS<\/b><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>MANCHESTER\u00a0<\/span><\/b>and then torpedo boats executed about 15 attacks against isolated ships and succeeded to sink 4 cargo ships.<\/span><\/p>\n

When at dawn of August 13, the British Admiral assembled the ships that remained, from the 14 supply ships only 3 were on sight.\u00a0 8 were sunk, the\u00a0Dorset<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>had strayed\u00a0<\/strong>northward and out of the two ships that had been hit by submarine torpedoes \u2013but not sunk- the previous night, the\u00a0Ohio<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>was lagging well behind the convoy and the\u00a0Brisbane<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Star\u00a0<\/strong>had sailed independently towards\u00a0Malta, having followed a quite different course from the convoy.<\/p>\n

Thanks to this clever action the\u00a0Brisbane<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Star\u00a0<\/strong>succeeded to reach its destination unobserved and without further damages, twenty four hours after the other ships.\u00a0 From the escort ships of the convoy, out of the 4 cruisers only the\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>KENYA\u00a0<\/strong>remained\u00a0<\/strong>(damaged by\u00a0 a torpedo), as well as 5 destroyers, the remaining having been sent to Gibraltar with the survivors of the ships that had been sunk.<\/p>\n

In the meantime the escort was reinforced from\u00a0Gibraltar, with the light cruiser\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>CHARYBDIS\u00a0<\/strong>and 2 destroyers and thus consisted of 2 cruisers and 7 destroyers.<\/p>\n

In the morning of August 13, the convoy was again air-attacked; the cargo ship\u00a0Dorset<\/strong>\u00a0-sailing at a distance northward of the convoy- sunk and the tanker\u00a0Ohio<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>was hit and had to be towed to\u00a0Malta.\u00a0 At\u00a014:30, when the convoy was approaching\u00a0Malta\u00a0and was under powerful fighter coverage, the escorts withdrew and the convoy was taken over by minesweepers that led her to the base.\u00a0 The escorts returned to\u00a0Gibraltar\u00a0with no further damages, in spite being attacked during their course by air and naval forces.<\/p>\n

Thus, 3 supply ships reached unharmed\u00a0Malta\u00a0and the next day the 2 that had been damaged, the\u00a0Ohio<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>and the\u00a0<\/strong>Brisbane<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Star<\/strong>.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

For just one third of the supply ships to reach their destination, the British lost 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer and 9 cargo ships. In addition 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers and 2 cargo ships suffered damages.\u00a0 The price paid was heavy, but with only the part of supplies that reached\u00a0Malta\u00a0the island resisted and the air forces were re-supplied with fuel, until a radical change of the situation in the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0in November allowed ease of supply.<\/p>\n

During that intermediate period that especially expensive operation didn\u2019t have to be repeated; only small quantities of supplies were sent with submarines and fast minelayers.\u00a0 In addition, from September 1942 it became possible for surface forces \u2013cruisers and destroyers- to use again the base.<\/p>\n

The small naval units that were used during the operation acted very well and had bright successes.\u00a0 Italian submarines sunk 1 cruiser and 2 cargo ships and caused damages to 2 cruisers and 2 cargo ships, while a German submarine sunk an aircraft carrier.\u00a0 Torpedo boats sunk 1 cruiser and 5 cargo ships.\u00a0 In addition, the Air force sunk 1 destroyer and 2 cargo ships and caused damages to 1 aircraft carrier and 3 cargo ships. The naval losses of the Axis were, on the other hand, just 2 Italian submarines.<\/p>\n

The aero-naval forces of the Axis however, didn\u2019t succeed to complete the destruction of the supply ships and in this case it would have had a very important impact on the whole development of the war in the\u00a0Mediterranean.\u00a0 In all probability, the destruction would have been completed if, as planned, after the disintegration of the convoy with other means, large naval units were used against the ships that were escaping.<\/p>\n

Indeed, in accordance with what was planned, 2 Italian cruiser squadrons and 11 destroyers had left their base at around\u00a019:00\u00a0of August 12 and were sailing in the Center Tyrrhenian Sea with instructions to be at dawn of next day in the Pantelleria area. \u00a0The Italian ships were detected before dark by the enemy air force that kept contact with them.\u00a0 The force continued sailing until\u00a0midnight\u00a0of August 12 -13, when it was suddenly ordered by the Supermarina to return to its base.\u00a0 The following explanations are supplied concerning that order:<\/p>\n

\u00a0Because of the important reinforcement of the air forces of\u00a0Malta, it was necessary to dispose efficient air protection of the cruisers, while at the same time it was necessary to escort the bombers assigned to the operation with fighters.\u00a0 The available fighters however were not sufficient for both objectives and the question was put to deliberation whether the completion of the destruction of the enemy convoy should be assigned to the Navy or to the Air force, each one claiming that honor.<\/p>\n

Thus, while the evening of August 12, the naval force was heading to execute her orders, in\u00a0Rome\u00a0discussions were going on between the various Italian and German services.\u00a0 As they weren\u2019t reaching any agreement the mater was presented to Mussolini who decided in favor of the Air force and the mission of the ships was cancelled.<\/p>\n

In relation to the above, one could argue that at that time the complete obstruction of supplying that strategic base was of such importance that it was justified to undertake any risk, as the British didn\u2019t hesitate in front of any sacrifice to succeed their objective of supplying Malta.\u00a0 Besides, as the cruisers were already sailing in the open sea and during their trip back to their base were exposed to dangers, as it was proved in reality.<\/p>\n

In the morning of August 13, near the\u00a0Aeolian Islands, a British submarine hit with torpedoes the cruiser\u00a0RN<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>BOLZANO\u00a0<\/strong>and 1 destroyer.\u00a0 A fire broke up on the cruiser and because one of her powder-magazines was threatened it had to be flooded and the cruiser was grounded on an islet, from where only a month later it was towed to\u00a0Naples.\u00a0 The destroyer also suffered damages, but succeeded to return to her base by her own means.<\/p>\n

Independently of the above opinion, since the basic condition to undertake the operation with the cruisers was securing their air coverage, it is puzzling why the relative discussions between the various services didn\u2019t take place before sending out the naval force and not when she was ready to act.\u00a0 In such a case they have depleted for nothing fuel that was in such scarce supply in the Italian Navy.\u00a0 This case offers one more example of the coordination of operations problems of the Navy and the Air force, when the Navy doesn\u2019t dispose a special naval Air force.<\/p>\n

Further, its worth noting that because the British ships disposed a powerful air coverage, although the Axis used about 800 air planes (bombers, torpedo planes and fighters), the results they succeeded weren\u2019t proportional to the size of that force.<\/p>\n

\u00a0——————————————————-<\/p>\n

If the British were meeting such serious difficulties in supplying\u00a0Malta, supply conditions of the Axis armies in\u00a0Libya\u00a0were becoming more and more difficult, because of increased action of the enemy submarines and airplanes.\u00a0 Their attacks were mainly directed against tankers.\u00a0 In August 1942, none arrived safely to destination. For that reason intensive use was made of destroyers, submarines and other small units \u2013even landing crafts- for the transport of fuel and ammunitions.<\/p>\n

In spite of these difficulties, 20,000 tons of supplies and 22,500 tons of fuel reached Libya in August 1942, with important losses however of 25% and 41% respectively.\u00a0 In September, results were better, 77,000 tons of supplies and fuel being transported with 20% losses.\u00a0 In October, 44% supplies loaded for\u00a0Libya\u00a0were lost, 46,000 tons reaching their destination.\u00a0 As we previously reported, supplies reaching the rear were late to reach the front and were suffering significant losses during their land transport.<\/p>\n

In spite of these difficulties, Rommel undertook an attack on\u00a0September 1, 1942, but was held in check in four days.\u00a0 Explaining his failure, he once more reported as causes – in order \u2013 the new antitank guns and the new tanks of the enemy, the important enemy supremacy in the air and fuel and ammunition shortages.\u00a0 Thus, it appears that the opinion expressed by\u00a0Admiral Doenitz<\/strong>, that the only responsible for the failure of the Axis in\u00a0North Africa\u00a0was the Italian Navy, is not justified.<\/p>\n

It is worthwhile noting that Rommel had realized, finally, how different the situation would have been if\u00a0Malta\u00a0was seized and passing from\u00a0Rome\u00a0at the end of September, recommended the undertaking of a seizure of the island operation.\u00a0 It was however too late and the only that could still be done was a retreat in\u00a0North Africa\u00a0to a fortified position; but this also was not done.<\/p>\n

Towards the middle of September 1942, the British undertook a complicated amphibian operation aiming at becoming for a while masters of the two more important ports of the Cyrenaica\u00a0 – Benghazi and Tobruk \u2013 and destroy their port facilities, fortifications, supply warehouses, airports, etc.\u00a0 If this operation were to develop as planned, results would have been catastrophic for the Axis, because for a short period at least the armies at the front would have been isolated.\u00a0 In this operation various kinds of forces participated: naval, air, landing, commandos, desert units, etc.\u00a0 The main combined operation took place against the\u00a0port\u00a0of\u00a0Tobruk, while desert units advanced from the interior towards both ports. From these units, the one that had as destination Tobruk succeeded to invade by surprise the night of September 13, and seize a gun battery.\u00a0 Thus, allowed a commando unit to land with patrol boats, while other units were landing further away from 2 destroyers.\u00a0 The other land battery resisted and the naval guard of the base succeeded to repel the invaders and oblige them to withdraw early in the morning, without inflicting any damages to the installations.\u00a0 The small Italian ships mooring in the port opened fire against the patrol ships and caused damages to them.\u00a0 Finally, during the withdrawal of the naval forces towards\u00a0Alexandria, the German Air force sunk the antiaircraft cruiser\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>COVENTRY\u00a0<\/strong>and caused damages to a destroyer.<\/p>\n

\"\"HMS COVENTRY<\/strong><\/p>\n

The operation against\u00a0Benghazi\u00a0had finally to be abandoned, because the force from the interior heading against it met powerful resistance.<\/p>\n

It was a bold operation that, even if well planned in all its details, completely failed with several losses.\u00a0 To succeed, absolute surprise that was very difficult to achieve was needed, unless the enemy had neglected any vigilance.\u00a0 The British were of course aware of that, but results could have been so important if the operation succeeded, that they decided to risk.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3172,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3693","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945"],"yoast_head":"\n7.3 The Malta supply operation of August 1942 - \u039d\u0391\u03a5\u0391\u03a1\u03a7\u039f\u03a3 \u0393\u03a1\u0397\u0393\u039f\u03a1\u0399\u039f\u03a3 \u039c\u0395\u0396\u0395\u0392\u0399\u03a1\u0397\u03a3<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/7-3-i-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-tis-maltas-tou-augoustou-1942\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"7.3 The Malta supply operation of August 1942 - 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