{"id":3675,"date":"2021-04-21T19:14:54","date_gmt":"2021-04-21T19:14:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/uncategorized\/6-2-nea-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-maltas\/"},"modified":"2021-05-24T10:00:18","modified_gmt":"2021-05-24T10:00:18","slug":"6-2-nea-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-maltas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/6-2-nea-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-maltas\/","title":{"rendered":"6.2 New Malta supply operation and the encounter of March 22, 1942"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cThe Italian and German leaderships had realized that in order to ensure victory in\u00a0North Africa\u00a0and seize the\u00a0Suez Canal\u00a0they had to neutralize\u00a0Malta, especially as Air force basis.\u00a0\u00a0Intensive air raids where the prelude of an operation to seize the island, an operation that \u2013as we will see later- was finally abandoned.<\/p>\n

The relative preparations started in January 1942.\u00a0\u00a0Italian and German armies transported by air and sea were scheduled to be used.\u00a0\u00a0Landing was planned to take place under the coverage of the Italian Fleet and the Italian navy undertook the fast construction of about 100 landing crafts, as well as training the naval and army units of attack.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Axis sea and air forces undertook a tight blockade of the island, in order to render its supply impossible.<\/p>\n

On the other hand,\u00a0Great Britain\u00a0was also considering this strategic basis as very important and because it was running out of supplies, it was decided in March 1942 to send again a large convoy.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Council of the Chiefs of Staff in\u00a0London\u00a0had decided that this operation had to be undertaken at any cost, as they considered that the supply of\u00a0Malta\u00a0was a main mission for the Mediterranean Fleet.<\/p>\n

To secure that convoy, every possible measure was taken by the Army, the Navy and the Air force.\u00a0\u00a0The Army pretended an attack in order to keep the enemy Air force busy.\u00a0\u00a0R.A.F attacked the\u00a0Cyrenaica\u00a0peninsula and\u00a0Crete\u00a0airports, covered with fighters the longest possible distance and proceeded to air reconnaissance from\u00a0Libya\u00a0and\u00a0Malta.<\/p>\n

The convoy consisted of 4 supply ships with a near escort of 1 antiaircraft cruiser and 6 destroyers. It left\u00a0Alexandria\u00a0the morning of March 20, followed in the afternoon of the same day by a force of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers under\u00a0Rear-Admiral Vian.<\/strong><\/p>\n

6 type \u2018Hunt\u2019 destroyers, that the previous night had executed an antisubmarine sweep between Tobruk and\u00a0Alexandria, joined the force the morning of March 21.\u00a0\u00a0During that mission a seventh destroyer of the same type was torpedoed by a German submarine and sunk.\u00a0\u00a0These escorts of a recent type disposed six 4″ antiaircraft guns and formed a good reinforcement for the antiaircraft protection of convoys.<\/p>\n

The morning of March 22, finally, the cruiser HMS PENELOPE and one destroyer from\u00a0Malta\u00a0joined the convoy.\u00a0\u00a0Until that moment \u2013 when the convoy had passed through the especially dangerous area between the\u00a0Cyrenaica\u00a0and\u00a0Crete\u00a0and was at a distance of about 250 miles from\u00a0Malta\u00a0\u2013 no attack had taken place against it.<\/p>\n

On the evening of March 21, however, Vian\u2019s force was detected by an Italian submarine and immediately 3 cruisers (2 heavy and 1 light) with 4 destroyers were ordered to leave Messina and from Taranto the battleship\u00a0RN<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>LITTORIO\u00a0<\/strong>\u2013under the C.I.C. of the Fleet \u2013 with 4 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a0The RN\u00a0LITTORIO force was detected by a British submarine patrolling south of\u00a0Taranto\u00a0but, because of the critical situation in\u00a0Malta, the local reconnaissance couldn\u2019t follow its movements.<\/p>\n

Starting the morning of March 22, and after the last fighter had left, the British formation was intensively and repeatedly bombed by enemy air forces.\u00a0\u00a0During the morning, the British formation\u2019s mighty anti-aircraft guns relatively easily repelled Italian torpedo planes attacking from a long distance.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Later however, when the German Air force arrived, the protection of the convoy became difficult.<\/p>\n

Admiral Vian was determined, even if he was to face mighty surface forces, to pursue his course towards his destination applying the following plan:<\/p>\n

4 cruisers and 11 Fleet destroyers organized in 5 teams acting independently would create a smoke screen between the convoy and the enemy and in case the later would try to cross it he would attack him with torpedoes.\u00a0\u00a0The anti-aircraft cruiser with a type \u2018Hunt\u2019 escort would be protecting the convoy with a smoke screen, while the remaining 5 escorts were to remain close-by to offer anti-aircraft protection.<\/p>\n

At around\u00a014:30, the British force observed northward and at a distance of about 12 miles the Italian cruiser squadron, first considered by the British as battleships.\u00a0\u00a0A very strong southeast wind was blowing.\u00a0\u00a0Vian applied his above mentioned plan and turned northward, while the convoy with its close-range escorts turned south.\u00a0\u00a0As soon as the Vian forces took their distance from the convoy they turned east and produced a smoke screen.\u00a0\u00a0The enemy ships opened fire at\u00a014:36\u00a0from a long distance, while at the same time trying to drag the British towards the RN VITTORIO.\u00a0\u00a0Admiral Vian, when he realized that they were cruisers, sailed towards them still producing a smoke screen.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0At\u00a014:56\u00a0it was the turn of the British cruisers to open fire against the enemy, but the later sailed northward and was soon out of range. Next Vian sailed to join the convoy.<\/p>\n

During that time the German Air force had concentrated its attacks against the convoy, from both high and low altitude, but the only result was a high ammunition usage by the escorts.<\/p>\n

In the meantime, the RN\u00a0LITTORIO had joined the Italian cruisers and that was later also noticed by the British.\u00a0\u00a0Admiral Vian kept protecting the convoy by smoke screen, which because of the strong southeast wind was extended northwestward.\u00a0\u00a0The C.I.C. of the Italian Fleet could have bypassed the smokescreen and contact the convoy, if he had sailed eastward towards the direction of the wind.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, he could have sailed in that direction with the RN\u00a0LITTORIO and send the cruisers in the opposite and thus place the convoy between two Italian forces.\u00a0\u00a0He chose to sail full speed westward to\u00a0interpose between the convoy and\u00a0Malta\u00a0because, if he sailed in the direction of the wind with the prevailing strong wave undulation, he would had to reduce speed and lose time.\u00a0\u00a0However, with that movement he didn\u2019t succeed his objective, the destruction of the convoy.<\/p>\n

For more than 2 hours and until dusk the opponent forces were hiding one from the other behind the smoke screen and were firing intermittently, when spotting an enemy ship.\u00a0\u00a0Admiral Iachino<\/strong>\u00a0didn\u2019t risk his ships by entering in the smokescreen.\u00a0\u00a0The British destroyers, on the other hand, executed repeated torpedo attacks coming close up to a distance of 6,000 meters, but with the prevailing sea conditions and the confusion of the smoke screen these attacks were not successful.\u00a0\u00a0The British ships suffered several damages, 2 cruisers and some destroyers were hit.<\/p>\n

At nightfall the battle was interrupted and at around\u00a019:00\u00a0the Italian force withdrew northward.\u00a0\u00a0Then, because the destroyers were being damaged by the storm and were unable to remain patrolling during the night, Supermarina ordered the Fleet to return to its bases.<\/p>\n

When the Italians withdrew and because it was quite improbable that they would undertake a night attack, Admiral Vian sent the convoy to Malta with the escort of an antiaircraft cruiser and the 6 \u2018Hunt\u2019 type destroyers that were joined by 2 ships from Mlata, the cruiser HMS\u00a0PENELOPE and 1 destroyer, as well as by 2 other damaged destroyers, while himself with the remaining force sailed towards Alexandria.\u00a0\u00a0After taking this decision, he received a signal from the C.I.C. of the Fleet saying that\u00a0\u201che evidently would consider dispersing the convoy and let it continue its course (with its close escort only) towards\u00a0<\/em>Malta<\/em>\u201d<\/em>.\u00a0\u00a0As Admiral Cunningham narrates, by sending that signal he wanted to take on him part of Vian\u2019s responsibilities.<\/p>\n

The convoy Commander ordered the dispersion of its ships, so that each could sail to\u00a0Malta\u00a0at top speed, escorted by 1-2 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a0The initial forecast was that the convoy would arrive to\u00a0Malta\u00a0in the morning of March 23, but sailing southward during the previous day brought a delay and this gave the opportunity to the enemy Air force to attack.<\/p>\n

The convoy was protected by fighters, but the escort ammunitions were dangerously depleted and were forced to fire only in case of imminent danger.\u00a0\u00a0The ships that Admiral Vian had so skillfully and under such adverse weather conditions protected the previous day were to have a bad end either at the approaches of\u00a0Malta\u00a0or inside its port.<\/p>\n

The naval tanker BRECONSHIRE (5,000 tons), while sailing at only 8 miles from\u00a0Malta, was hit by a bomb in the engine room and was immobilized.\u00a0\u00a0Then, during the following night it was towed to the port but on March 27 was again hit and sunk.\u00a0\u00a0However, an important part of its cargo was saved.<\/p>\n

Another ship of the convoy was sunk by the enemy Air force that also caused damages to the escort destroyer, while sailing at a distance of 50 miles from\u00a0Malta.<\/p>\n

Finally, the remaining 2 supply ships were attacked on March 26 from the air inside the port and one of them and a destroyer sunk, while the other suffered important damages.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, with the exception of the part of the tanker\u2019s fuel that was saved, from the 26,000 tons of supplies that\u00a0Malta\u00a0was expecting in agony, just 5,000 tons were saved.\u00a0\u00a0Such was the situation that even if supply ships succeeded with superhuman efforts to reach\u00a0Malta\u00a0enough time wasn\u2019t given to them to unload their cargo before being destroyed inside the port.<\/p>\n

These damages weren\u2019t the only suffered by the British in that operation.\u00a0\u00a0The Vian force ships while returning to\u00a0Alexandria\u00a0were not hit by the enemy air attacks, thanks to the fighter planes sent to protect them, but because of rough seas many destroyers suffered damages.\u00a0\u00a0As a result, on\u00a0March 26, 142, the Alexandria Fleet disposed only 2 Fleet destroyers usable, all the remaining being under repairs.<\/p>\n

Italian ships suffered even more serious damages, as a result of weather conditions.\u00a0\u00a0Two destroyers sunk almost with all hands on and most of the remaining were in need of long overhauls.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that weather damages to the Italian ships were much more important is not strange.\u00a0\u00a0As it was also noticed by the Hellenic Navy that disposed destroyers of both type, the Italian was inferior to the British in naval capabilities.<\/p>\n

The March 22 encounter was the subject of international analyses.<\/p>\n

The decisions taken by Admiral Vian cannot be criticized and he was rightfully honored for them.\u00a0\u00a0He successfully faced heavy ships with light under heavy air attacks, he absolutely protected the convoy he was escorting, independently of the final outcome for which he is not responsible.<\/p>\n

On the contrary, Admiral Iachino\u2019s maneuvers were not the most indicated to succeed his objective, the destruction of the enemy convoy.\u00a0\u00a0Maybe he wasn\u2019t totally wrong not wanting to cross the smokescreen with RN LITTORIO, since he didn\u2019t dispose enough destroyers. However, as we have previously mentioned, there were other ways to act that could give many probabilities to destroy the convoy without placing the battleship in excessive danger.\u00a0\u00a0It is also worth noting that Admiral Cunningham mentions that the Italian ships\u2019 fire against the attacking British destroyers was exact and that it was by pure chance that their damages were not more serious.<\/p>\n

It seems that the Italian Navy failure in that operation had an additional result.\u00a0\u00a0The German Air force that in the past was showing little willingness to sincerely cooperate with the Italian Navy, after that encounter was showing even less.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3172,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3675","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945"],"yoast_head":"\n6.2 New Malta supply operation and the encounter of March 22, 1942 - \u039d\u0391\u03a5\u0391\u03a1\u03a7\u039f\u03a3 \u0393\u03a1\u0397\u0393\u039f\u03a1\u0399\u039f\u03a3 \u039c\u0395\u0396\u0395\u0392\u0399\u03a1\u0397\u03a3<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/6-2-nea-epixeirisi-anefodiasmou-maltas\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"6.2 New Malta supply operation and the encounter of March 22, 1942 - 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