{"id":3638,"date":"2021-04-21T18:22:36","date_gmt":"2021-04-21T18:22:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/uncategorized\/4-10-i-maxi-tis-kritis-meros-b\/"},"modified":"2021-05-24T09:36:44","modified_gmt":"2021-05-24T09:36:44","slug":"4-10-i-maxi-tis-kritis-meros-b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/4-10-i-maxi-tis-kritis-meros-b\/","title":{"rendered":"4.10 The battle of Crete – Part II"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cIn spite of the adverse evolution of land operations in Crete, the British continued sending reinforcements till the last minute.\u00a0\u00a0On the night of May 23 \u2013 May 24 1941, 2 destroyers transported and successfully landed absolutely necessary ammunitions to the\u00a0Suda<\/strong>\u00a0naval base.<\/p>\n

A quite strange intervention of the British Admiralty to the job of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet was noticed during these days.\u00a0\u00a0On May 22, a troops transport ship carrying military reinforcements had left Alexandria escorted for\u00a0Tymbaki<\/strong>\u00a0on the south coast of Crete.\u00a0\u00a0However, because of the very intense action of the enemy Air force in that area,\u00a0Admiral Cunningham<\/strong>\u00a0in agreement with\u00a0General Wawell\u00a0<\/strong>ordered the troops transport ship to return to his base, because as he writes it would consist pure murder.\u00a0\u00a0Next, the Admiralty gave direct orders to the ship to pursue its course towards the initial destination and an hour later with a signal addressed to Admiral Cunningham an order was given the reinforcements to land at night, in case this was possible.\u00a0\u00a0As it was too late for this to take place, the Admiral reverted to his previous order and ordered the ship to change course and head to Alexandria.<\/p>\n

On that same day, with another signal of the Admiralty, the C.I.C. of the Mediterranean Fleet was ordered to stop the following days, no mater at what cost, the sea transport of enemy reinforcements to Crete. In addition, the Committee of Staff Officers in London asked the Admiral to submit an evaluation of the situation. Admiral Cunningham replied that, because of the intensity of the enemy air attacks, he didn\u2019t consider possible the Fleet to operate by daylight in the Aegean Sea and near Crete.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the Committee of Staff Officers came back insisting that it was absolutely necessary to block the dispatch to the Island of enemy reinforcements, independently of the size of the losses.\u00a0\u00a0The Admiral replied presenting the losses incurred up to that moment, adding that if they continued at the same rate the British Fleet would lose control of East Mediterranean.\u00a0\u00a0And anyhow, there was no way to stop the enemy air transports.<\/p>\n

In the meantime, the British Fleet had additional losses. To disable the airport of the island of Carpathos used by the enemy to attack Crete, it was decided to attack it by airplanes of the aircraft carrier\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>FORMIDABLE.\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>The aircraft carrier left Alexandria on May 25 escorted by 2 battleships and 8 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a0The airport was successfully bombed at dawn of the following day and the naval force remained at a distance of 100 miles southwest of Carpathos.\u00a0\u00a0On their way back to Alexandria enemy airplanes attacked the ships and the aircraft carrier and 1 destroyer suffered very serious damages.<\/p>\n

There was one more attempt to send reinforcements to Tymbaki.\u00a0\u00a0On May 26, airplanes attacked the troops transport ship and caused to the ship serious damages.\u00a0\u00a0It was finally forced to reverse course and return empty-handed to Alexandria.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the British succeeded in the night of May 26- May 27 to land at Suda troops and ammunitions, safely transported by 1 mines-layer and 2 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a0This was the last dispatch of reinforcements.\u00a0\u00a0However, bombers attacked the force covering these ships and hit -causing several damages- the battleship\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>BARHAM<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

On May 26, it became apparent that the battle of Crete would be lost.\u00a0\u00a0To the appeal of the British Prime Minister to spare no effort to keep the Island, General Wawell replied that there was no hope left.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, on May 27, it was decided to evacuate Crete.<\/p>\n

It is a strange coincidence because, according to an Italian source, on that exact day \u2013May 26- the German Air force had come to the conclusion that with only the paratroopers it couldn\u2019t break the British resistance and had asked permission to abandon the operation. Hitler\u2019s reply to this request was that the operation should go on at any price.<\/p>\n

The situation of the British Fleet o the Mediterranean at the time of evacuation of the British troops from Crete was such that this operation was much more difficult than the previous evacuation of mainland Greece.\u00a0\u00a0Several ships of the Fleet had been sunk, many had suffered damages and were undergoing repairs and those in operation were in need of inspection and engine repairs, after operating continuously for 2 months, and their crews had reached the limits of human endurance.\u00a0\u00a0The C.I.C., who was so reserved concerning the utility of the continuation of the struggle in Crete, without hesitation took up this mission, considering that saving the maximum number of British troops \u2013at whatever cost- was a mater of honor for the Navy.<\/p>\n

22,000 men had to be taken aboard the ships at night, especially from open coastlines of South Crete, with the exception of those located in Heraklion that were scheduled to board in that port. About 4,000 men boarded at Heraklion port the night of May 28- May 29 on 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers, without being detected by the enemy.\u00a0\u00a0The enemy Air force had already attacked that force, while on her way to Heraklion.\u00a0\u00a01 of the 3 cruisers of the force had suffered damages \u2013 the\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>AJAX\u00a0<\/strong>that was ordered to return to Alexandria- and the destroyer\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>IMPERIAL.\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>Just\u00a0<\/strong>after departing from Heraklion, damage in the steering gear of the destroyer was detected, due to previous bombing, and the ship had to be sunk, once those onboard were transferred to another destroyer.<\/p>\n

While sailing towards Alexandria, the remaining ships were attacked at dawn of May 29.\u00a0\u00a0The destroyer\u00a0HMS\u00a0<\/strong>HEREWARD<\/strong>\u00a0was hit and had to reduce speed.\u00a0\u00a0The force commander, Rear-Admiral\u00a0Rawlings\u00a0<\/strong>was then obliged to take the tough decision to abandon that ship with those on board because, if he remained near, it would increase the risk for the remaining ships.\u00a0\u00a0Later, an Italian torpedo plane sank that ship and Italian torpedo boats rescued the shipwrecked.\u00a0\u00a0The attacks were continuing and the destroyer\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>DECOY\u00a0<\/strong>and the cruisers\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>DIDO\u00a0<\/strong>and especially the\u00a0<\/strong>HMS\u00a0<\/strong>ORION\u00a0<\/strong>suffered serious damages.<\/p>\n

Thus, from a force of 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers, all the cruisers and 1 destroyer suffered damages and 2 destroyers were sunk.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the ships were overcrowded with troops, human losses were also very important. From the 1,100 men that boarded the\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>ORION,\u00a0<\/strong>260 were killed and 280 injured.<\/p>\n

The departure from the south coast of\u00a0Crete\u00a0\u2013that benefited from a certain degree of air coverage by fighters- was made with much less losses. On the night of May 28 \u2013 May 29, about 700 men boarded at\u00a0Sfakia<\/strong>\u00a04 destroyers and 1 troops transport ship and safely arrived to\u00a0Alexandria\u00a0with only light damages to a destroyer.\u00a0\u00a0The main operation took place the following night, when about 9.000 men boarded at Sfakia 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers and 1 troops transport ship.\u00a0\u00a0During their sail to\u00a0Egypt\u00a0they faced 3 air attacks, but only 1 cruiser was damaged.\u00a0\u00a0Another 4,000 men boarded on the night of May 30 \u2013 May 31, 2 destroyers, one of which was damaged, and the following night the last evacuation took place with 1 cruiser, 1 mines layer and 3 destroyers, on which 4,000 men boarded.\u00a0\u00a0This force didn\u2019t face an air attack.\u00a0\u00a0The ships however that had been sent to reinforce its protection, the antiaircraft cruisers\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>CALCUTTA\u00a0<\/strong>and\u00a0HMS\u00a0<\/strong>COVENTRY,\u00a0<\/strong>were attacked\u00a0<\/strong>a few hours after their departure from Alexandria and the\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>CALCUTTA\u00a0<\/strong>was sunk.<\/p>\n

A number of British that still remained on the\u00a0Island\u00a0were authorized to surrender, because there was not any possibility for further action.\u00a0\u00a0The British Fleet of the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0had in active service at that precise moment only 2 battleships, 1 cruiser, 2 antiaircraft cruisers, 1 mine layer and 9 destroyers. About 16,000 men had been safely transported to\u00a0Egypt\u00a0and about 5,000 men remained in\u00a0Crete.<\/p>\n

Under similar conditions escaped to\u00a0Egypt\u00a0the ships of the Hellenic Navy that were saved after the occupation of\u00a0Greece.\u00a0\u00a0The King of Greece and his retinue boarded on the night of May 22 \u2013 May 23 at the south coast of\u00a0Crete\u00a0the British destroyers\u00a0HMS<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>DECOY\u00a0<\/strong>and\u00a0<\/strong>HMS\u00a0<\/strong>HERO\u00a0<\/strong>and were transported to\u00a0Alexandria.\u00a0\u00a0Because the British battle Fleet was also sailing towards\u00a0Alexandria\u00a0at the same time, the destroyers were ordered to join its coverage, so as to avoid being the target of an isolated air attack.<\/p>\n

During the battle of\u00a0Crete\u00a0the British Fleet of the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0lost 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a02 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers were in need of many months of repairs and 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers of several weeks.\u00a0\u00a0Naval manpower losses had reached 2,000 dead.<\/p>\n

All these losses were exclusively due to the German Air force.\u00a0\u00a0The Navy, alone, couldn\u2019t save\u00a0Crete; plentiful and suitable air forces were needed.\u00a0\u00a0In spite of insufficient antiaircraft means, it is estimated that German losses during the battle of\u00a0Crete\u00a0reached 400 aircrafts and around 20,000 men.<\/p>\n

In this case also, the Italian Fleet was completely absent.\u00a0\u00a0Once more it didn\u2019t take advantage of an excellent opportunity, when the British ships were operating under the shadow of the German Air force and the Mediterranean force was vastly reduced.\u00a0\u00a0It is however possible, as previously explained, that the Germans preferred to complete this operation without any assistance, fearing that active involvement of the Italians would create rights in the Aegean for them.<\/p>\n

Thus ended the operations caused by the Greek resistance against the Axis.\u00a0\u00a0The price paid was heavy, for both the Greeks and the British, but as counterweight the German attack against\u00a0Russia\u00a0was delayed and this had an important effect on the final outcome of the War.<\/p>\n

Following these operations, with the enemy already holding the airports in mainland\u00a0Greece\u00a0and in\u00a0Crete\u00a0and the naval forces of the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0significantly reduced, the strategic situation in\u00a0Eastern Mediterranean\u00a0had become very adverse for the British.\u00a0\u00a0The Navy had still to re-supply Tobruk and the destroyers and other small ships that it disposed to that end had suffered many losses from air attacks.\u00a0\u00a0Its main objective was to interrupt the re-supply of\u00a0Libya\u00a0from\u00a0Italy, but it was impossible for surface ships to remain in\u00a0Malta\u00a0and for that reason this task was carried out by submarines and airplanes.\u00a0\u00a0After the incapacitation of the aircraft carriers of the Mediterranean Fleet, there was no air coverage of convoys and the re-supply of\u00a0Malta\u00a0was becoming impossible.\u00a0\u00a0Only small quantities of fuel and of some indispensable supplies were sent with 2 submarine-mine layers.\u00a0\u00a0For all practical reasons, the Mediterranean sea-ways of the\u00a0British Empire\u00a0had been rendered useless.<\/p>\n

Reporting the above to the Admiralty, Admiral Cunningham maintained that there was mainly need of presence of strong air forces, fighters for air coverage of the ships and bombers for continuously attacking the enemy airports of the\u00a0Aegean.\u00a0\u00a0He also repeated his previous suggestion for the creation of a coastal air force disposing torpedo planes, bombers and reconnaissance planes that would take over the mission of the missing aircraft carriers.\u00a0\u00a0The need for fighters and bombers for land operations in\u00a0Libya\u00a0was equally pressing.\u00a0\u00a0If all the above weren\u2019t realized soon, he was predicting a catastrophe.<\/p>\n

In June 1941, the British Fleet of the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0had another mission to fulfill.\u00a0\u00a0It undertook to support from sea the British operations in\u00a0Syria, where there was danger of German infiltration, because of the doubtful attitude of the French Vichy forces stationed there.\u00a0\u00a0The British force with 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers and a few airplanes faced the French naval forces of 3 flotilla leaders and 3 submarines.\u00a0\u00a0Following the operations that took place, 3 British destroyers suffered important damages and from the French ships, 1 flotilla leader and 1 submarine were sunk, while the other 2 flotilla leaders were damaged.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3172,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3638","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945"],"yoast_head":"\n4.10 The battle of Crete - 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