{"id":3589,"date":"2021-04-20T21:51:45","date_gmt":"2021-04-20T21:51:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/uncategorized\/3-7-i-sinantisi-stin-akra-teulada\/"},"modified":"2021-06-24T18:47:14","modified_gmt":"2021-06-24T18:47:14","slug":"3-7-the-battle-of-cape-teulada","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/3-7-the-battle-of-cape-teulada\/","title":{"rendered":"3.7 The battle of Cape Teulada"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cFollowing the neutralization in\u00a0Taranto\u00a0of half the Italian battle Fleet [see:\u00a0\u201cThe aeronautic operation of Taranto<\/em>\u201d<\/a> ],\u00a0\u00a0the British decided an important convoy from\u00a0England\u00a0to cross the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0to transport supplies to\u00a0Malta\u00a0and\u00a0Alexandria.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0As usual, the convoy was to be escorted up to the Sicily Straits by force \u201cH\u201d of\u00a0Gibraltar\u00a0and off\u00a0Malta\u00a0be turned over to the Alexandria Fleet.\u00a0\u00a0On this occasion, the latter would execute some additional operations in\u00a0Eastern Mediterranean\u00a0and among these would escort a convoy to\u00a0Malta.\u00a0\u00a0Because the\u00a0Gibraltar\u00a0force included only 1 battleship, that convoy was to rendezvous South-West of Sardinia with a squadron of ships from\u00a0Alexandria\u00a0that included 1 battleship, 3 cruisers and 5 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, increased protection was being offered in the most dangerous part of the route to\u00a0Malta.<\/p>\n

The convoy that sailed through Gibraltar was formed of only 3 cargo ships with close escort of 2 cruisers and 5 destroyers, while force \u201cH\u201d that offered coverage included 1 battleship, 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers.<\/p>\n

On the morning of\u00a0November 25, 1940, the Italians were informed that the\u00a0Gibraltar\u00a0force was sailing east, but weren\u2019t aware of the presence of the convoy from\u00a0England.\u00a0\u00a0The following day they were informed that the Alexandria Fleet was detected west of\u00a0Crete\u00a0sailing west.\u00a0\u00a0With the perspective that an important enemy operation was under way, the order was given to the Italian Fleet that included the battleships\u00a0VITTORIO<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>VENETO<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>and\u00a0CESARE,\u00a0<\/strong>6\u00a0<\/strong>heavy cruisers and 14 destroyers to take up a position in the morning of November 27\u00a0\u00a0South-West of Sardinia.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\"\"RN GUILIO CESARE<\/strong><\/p>\n

For the Italians it was a unique opportunity to attack with much more powerful forces one of the two British formations, the force \u201cH\u201d or the reinforcement force that was detached from\u00a0Alexandria, before these two forces joined.\u00a0\u00a0Evidently, the success of this operation depended from getting exact intelligence from air reconnaissance.\u00a0\u00a0However,\u00a0for one more time the Navy,\u00a0was not served well.<\/p>\n

On 10:40 hours of November 27, reconnaissance reported the presence of the \u201cH\u201d force off\u00a0Cape Bon of Tunisia<\/strong>\u00a0with a feebler formation than reality, as the presence of the aircraft carrier wasn\u2019t reported and\u00a0Admiral Campioni<\/strong>, the Commander in Chief of the Italian Fleet, rushed to meet her.\u00a0\u00a0In the meantime however, the two British formations had joined forces since\u00a011:30\u00a0hours and subsequent reconnaissance intelligence concerning the formation of the enemy force was vague.\u00a0\u00a0The impression was thus given that the force included 3 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier.\u00a0\u00a0The Italians concluded that the British forces were superior and following the\u00a0Taranto\u00a0destruction the C.I.C. of the Fleet had orders to avoid a fight in case he did not dispose decisive superiority of forces.\u00a0\u00a0As a result, towards\u00a0noon, he took an evasion course towards his base.<\/p>\n

On\u00a012:15\u00a0hours, an Italian cruiser squadron south of the main force of the Fleet came into contact with the British cruisers. A fight followed that lasted about an hour during which the battleships of both sides got also engaged.\u00a0\u00a0Finally the Italian ships withdrew under the protection of a smoke screen, without having succeeded anything worthwhile.\u00a0\u00a0A British cruiser was hit twice and an Italian destroyer was seriously damaged, but the Italians succeeded to tow her.\u00a0\u00a0A torpedo plane attack from the British aircraft carrier brought no results.\u00a0\u00a0The bombers that the Italian Admiral had requested executed their attack at\u00a014:07\u00a0hours; they were unsuccessful. So was their second attack that followed.<\/p>\n

\"\"RN VITORIO\u00a0VENETO<\/strong><\/p>\n

In that case also, the comparison of forces was in favour of the Italians.\u00a0\u00a0The opponents disposed of 2 battleships each, but the presence of\u00a0VITTORIO<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>VENETO\u00a0<\/strong>gave\u00a0<\/strong>advantage to the Italians.\u00a0\u00a0Burt even if the Italian Admiral was under the impression that the British disposed of 3 battleships, again, the Italians in counterweight had a significant advantage in heavy cruisers.\u00a0\u00a0Besides, since the moment the two Fleets came into contact, it wasn\u2019t difficult to check their formation.\u00a0\u00a0The Italian C.I.C. of the Fleet was again carried away from his assiduity to the formal application of the Supreme Command orders and hurried to withdraw.\u00a0\u00a0He could have waited at least for the intervention of the bombers that he had requested, irrespective of the fact that when they came they didn\u2019t bring any positive result.<\/p>\n

In any case, the inefficiency of the Italian air cooperation was proved once more.\u00a0\u00a0While the Fleet was operating close to the\u00a0Sardinia\u00a0airfields, the Air force fighters didn\u2019t protect it from the enemy torpedo plane attacks and the bombers that he requested came too late.\u00a0\u00a0The C.I.C. of the naval force had to report to the Supermarina that would then transmit the request to the Supreme Air Command.\u00a0\u00a0The latter would evaluate the situation, draw an operations plan and then issue orders to the air commanders of the various areas, who would finally order the air units.\u00a0\u00a0These conclusions of war experience give the best argument for the absolute necessity of existence of a separate naval aviation.<\/p>\n

The British Admiralty was also dissatisfied with the actions of\u00a0Admiral\u00a0<\/strong>James<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Fownes<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Somerville,<\/strong>\u00a0the C.I.C. of the\u00a0Gibraltar\u00a0force, because he didn\u2019t pursue the chase of the Italian Fleet.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Admiral\u2019s judgment, his main objective was the safe arrival to destination of the convoy he was covering and that he had no right to jeopardize. It\u2019s a dilemma often faced by those who command convoys.\u00a0\u00a0If they decide to abandon them in order to attack an enemy force that appears \u2013 and especially a more powerful one, as in the present case- and their action is successful, they deserve any honor.\u00a0\u00a0If however their action ends up to the destruction of the convoy, they responsibility is heavily engaged.\u00a0\u00a0The Admiralty in the present case went as far as to refer the Admiral to an Inquest Committee that finally cleared him.\u00a0\u00a0Admiral Cunningham<\/strong>\u00a0furious for the treatment reserved to\u00a0Admiral\u00a0<\/strong>Somerville,\u00a0<\/strong>wrote in relation to this event that it is not tolerable a general officer that does the best under very difficult conditions to be continuously under the threat of his referal to\u00a0an Inquest Committee- that was waiting for him when he returned to his base- because his actions do not coincide with the judgment of those in the Center that have very little knowledge of the real events.<\/p>\n

\"\"Admiral Arturo<\/strong> Ricardi<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"Admiral Angelo Iachino<\/strong><\/p>\n

While the adverse development of land operations in\u00a0<\/span>Albania<\/span>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>\u00a0cause the resignation of\u00a0Marshal Badoglio<\/b>, important changes in the structure and command of the Italian Navy take place in December 1940.\u00a0\u00a0The two pre-existing surface ship Fleets where united to a single force under\u00a0Admiral Angelo Iachino<\/b>, ex-commander of the 2nd<\/sup>\u00a0Fleet.\u00a0Admiral Domenico Cavagnari<\/b>, Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, was replaced by\u00a0Admiral Arturo Ricardi<\/b>\u00a0and his deputy\u00a0Admiral Inigo Campioni<\/b>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Italian Fleet at that time included 3 large battleships \u2013the\u00a0VITTORIO\u00a0<\/b><\/span>VENETO<\/span><\/b>, GIULIO CESARE and DORIA<\/span><\/b>\u00a0– , 7 heavy and 8 light cruisers, in addition to the ships undergoing repairs.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

When the British launched their attack in\u00a0<\/span>North Africa<\/span>, the supply needs of\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>\u00a0significantly increased for the Italians.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In the period from October 1940 to January 1941, about 198.000 tons were transported.\u00a0\u00a0During October and November no loss was recorded, while in December and January losses reached 7% only.\u00a0\u00a0When the British encircled the Italian garrisons of\u00a0Bardia<\/b>\u00a0and\u00a0Tobruk,\u00a0<\/b>in\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>, they\u00a0<\/b>were re-supplied by submarines.\u00a0\u00a0The old cruiser\u00a0ST. GIORGIO \u2013\u00a0<\/b>of the Italian-Turk war period of 1911\u00a0\u2013\u00a0<\/b>was effectively used as floating gun battery for the defense of Tobruk.<\/span><\/p>\n

In December 1940, the British air attacks against the harbors and the naval bases of\u00a0<\/span>South Italy<\/span>\u00a0became more intensive. As a result, the choice of naval bases for the Italian Fleet was not dictated any more by strategic needs, air safety of the ships became the main criterion.\u00a0\u00a0After an attack against\u00a0<\/span>Naples<\/span>\u00a0-where the main naval force was concentrated- during which the\u00a0cruiser POLA<\/b>\u00a0was hit, the ships changed their\u00a0<\/span>Naples<\/span>\u00a0base for\u00a0Maddalena<\/b>\u00a0and\u00a0<\/span>Cagliari<\/span><\/b>\u00a0in\u00a0<\/span>Sardinia<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0However, because operations in\u00a0<\/span>Central Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0were thus made more difficult, they were ordered back to\u00a0<\/span>Naples<\/span>. During a fierce attack against\u00a0<\/span>Naples<\/span>\u00a0on the night of\u00a0<\/span>January 8, 1941<\/span>, the battleship\u00a0GUILIO CESARE<\/b>\u00a0was hit.\u00a0\u00a0She was sent for repairs to\u00a0<\/span>La Spezia<\/span><\/b>, where she was joined by the\u00a0VITTORIO VENETO\u00a0<\/b>that was thus taken further away from the operations area.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"RN POLA<\/strong><\/p>\n

Among other operations undertaken by the British Fleet during that month, on the night of January 19, while cruisers and destroyers were patrolling in the\u00a0<\/span>Adriatic Sea<\/span>\u00a0without making any contact with enemy ships, 2 battleships bombed with 100 15″ shells the\u00a0<\/span>harbor<\/span>\u00a0of\u00a0<\/span>Avlona<\/span>\u00a0in\u00a0<\/span>Albania<\/span>. It was an intimidating operation because indirect night fire without observation could not give worthwhile results.\u00a0\u00a0The Italians were taken by surprise and didn\u2019t react.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the meantime, with the British advance in\u00a0<\/span>North Africa<\/span>, the control by the British Fleet of the\u00a0<\/span>Central Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0was significantly facilitated and the re-supply of the Italian armies became more difficult.<\/span><\/p>\n

Generally speaking, at the end of 1940 the situation in the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0appeared much more favorable for the British, than 6 months earlier.\u00a0\u00a0The German Air force, however, hadn\u2019t yet appeared in the area\u2026\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3172,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3589","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945"],"yoast_head":"\n3.7 The battle of Cape Teulada - \u039d\u0391\u03a5\u0391\u03a1\u03a7\u039f\u03a3 \u0393\u03a1\u0397\u0393\u039f\u03a1\u0399\u039f\u03a3 \u039c\u0395\u0396\u0395\u0392\u0399\u03a1\u0397\u03a3<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/3-7-the-battle-of-cape-teulada\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"3.7 The battle of Cape Teulada - 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