{"id":3542,"date":"2021-04-20T20:44:00","date_gmt":"2021-04-20T20:44:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/uncategorized\/1-2-to-italiko-nautiko\/"},"modified":"2021-06-24T18:33:53","modified_gmt":"2021-06-24T18:33:53","slug":"1-2-to-italiko-nautiko","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/1-2-to-italiko-nautiko\/","title":{"rendered":"1.2 The Italian Navy"},"content":{"rendered":"

During the between the wars period\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0applied an intensive shipbuilding program that would endow her with a really important Fleet.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, as battle ships four new 35.000 tons battleships were planned, with speed of 30 miles\/hour and armed with nine 381 mm guns (the\u00a0Littorio, Vittorio Veneto, Roma<\/b>\u00a0and\u00a0Imperio<\/b>) and four overhauled old battleships of 23.000 tons, with speed of 26 miles\/hour and armed with ten 320 mm guns\u00a0<\/span>(the\u00a0<\/span>Conte<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>di<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>Cavour<\/span>,\u00a0<\/span><\/b>Giulio<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>Cesare<\/span>,\u00a0<\/span><\/b>Duito<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>and\u00a0<\/span>Doria<\/span><\/b>).<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"Battleship Conte di Cavour
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"
\nBattleship Guilio Cesare
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

However, in accordance with the directions given to the Navy, because there was no probability of going to war before 1942, the shipbuilding program was scheduled to be completed towards the end of that year, while war started two years earlier.<\/p>\n

Thus, in June 1940 from the 8 battleships only two, the Cavour and Cesare, were in service.\u00a0\u00a0The construction of the two large battleships – Litttorio\u00a0\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u00a0Vitorio\u00a0Veneto- and the overhauling of two olds –\u00a0Duito\u00a0and\u00a0Doria\u00a0\u2013 was still going on, the\u00a0Roma\u00a0was planned to be operational in two years and for the construction of the\u00a0Imperio\u00a0\u2013 whose construction was finally abandoned- three more years were needed.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, 12 light cruisers were under construction as well as an important number of destroyers, escorts, submarines and other smaller units.<\/p>\n

Therefore, on the day\u00a0Italy\u00a0declared war, her Fleet disposed as large ships the two overhauled old battleships and 19 cruisers.\u00a0\u00a0However, as it turns up in the memoirs of Admiral\u00a0Andrew Cunningham,\u00a0<\/strong>the Italians had succeeded in keeping in doubt the British as far as the number of ready for war ships was concerned.\u00a0\u00a0In addition the British ignored many other shortcomings of the Italian Navy.<\/p>\n

The Italians on the other hand stress especially the difficult situation that the Italian Navy faced from the point of view of air force of naval cooperation, under her triple aspect, reconnaissance at sea, protection of friendly naval forces and attack actions against the enemy.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, by studying the various points of view that are expressed concerning the evolution of the war operations, one can draw the conclusion that the absence of sufficient air cover was one of the main reasons for the misfortunes of the Italian Fleet.\u00a0\u00a0It\u2019s worthwhile to point out however that, in some cases at least, Admiral Andrew Cunningham doesn\u2019t seem to agree with this conclusion.<\/p>\n

The Italian Navy had already created a naval air force during World War I, which however had been dismantled in 1923 when a special Air force Corps was created.\u00a0\u00a0According to Mussolini, the Italian peninsula constituted a big aircraft carrier and the Air force\u2019s aircrafts could undertake any naval mission from their bases on the mainland.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, any proposal by the Navy to create a naval air force or build aircraft carriers was rejected.\u00a0\u00a0It was only when the evolution of the war operations had shown how wrong that point of view was, that Mussolini gave the order in 1941 to transform 2 ocean liners into aircraft carriers.\u00a0\u00a0It was however too late and the war ended for\u00a0Italy\u00a0before these ships were launched.<\/p>\n

What was created was an \u201cAir force for the Navy\u201d destined to naval air reconnaissance.\u00a0\u00a0The operational use of this air force belonged to the Navy that dispatched its own observers. However, the Air force had never completely understood the air problems of the Navy. Thus, upon the declaration of war, when the Italian air forces outnumbered those of the enemy, the lack of efficient cooperation of the Navy with the Air force had a negative effect on the naval operations.\u00a0\u00a0Besides, the about 100 reconnaissance airplanes that were assigned to the Navy were sufficient in number at the beginning of the war, but most of them of an unsuitable type and of poor performance.\u00a0\u00a0They were single engine hydroplanes with 180 km maximum speed.\u00a0\u00a0Because the replacement of their losses wasn\u2019t possible, their number kept falling.<\/p>\n

The Air force would undertake several reconnaissance missions to give a helping hand to the Navy.\u00a0\u00a0However the results were not satisfactory, because their personnel lacked experience.\u00a0\u00a0What was worse was that in some cases wrong intelligence was given and this had very serious consequences on war operations.<\/p>\n

In addition, while the British reconnaissance was also operating at night, the Italians didn\u2019t dispose night reconnaissance throughout the war.\u00a0\u00a0Only towards the end of the confrontation in the\u00a0Mediterranean, German airplanes were sometimes executing night reconnaissance flights.<\/p>\n

The Italian Air force had neglected to build torpedo planes, while the Navy had developed a special type of torpedo that could be launched from a 100 meters height, from air planes flying at 300 km\/hour speed.\u00a0\u00a0It was during the war that the Air force decided to use torpedo planes carrying torpedoes supplied by the Navy.<\/p>\n

The British Navy also disposed few naval airplanes at the beginning of the war [see:\u00a0\u201c<\/em>The British Fleet of the Mediterranean<\/em>\u201d\u00a0<\/em><\/a>]. The personnel was however much more experienced in naval cooperation and succeeded to more or less satisfy the reconnaissance needs, until a sufficient number of air planes was supplied.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0On the Italian side, on the other hand, results were unsatisfactory in spite of the great efforts made by the Italian Air force during the war to improve her cooperation with the Navy. To gain the necessary experience a long period of training and preparation was indeed necessary.<\/p>\n

For a Navy as powerful as the Italian, even if it did not dispose aircraft carriers, the existence of a separate naval Air force Corps disposing the types of aircrafts that the Navy considered appropriate, was absolutely necessary.\u00a0\u00a0The solution that was given in\u00a0Italy\u00a0for naval reconnaissance is the one usually applied for reasons of economy by smaller Navies.\u00a0\u00a0It can nevertheless be more efficient if during the peace period the Air force complies with the suggestions of the Navy, as far as the types of aircrafts is concerned, and with joint manoeuvres personnel training is kept at high level.<\/p>\n

In some cases, the observed inactivity of the Italian Navy can be attributed to another very serious shortcoming, to the lack of sufficient fuel stocks.\u00a0\u00a0At the time of war declaration fuel stocks reached 1.8 million tons, a quantity that was considered sufficient for 9 months of war needs.\u00a0\u00a0Beyond this period of time the Germans had assumed the responsibility of re-supplying. They never kept their promise.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, the initially scheduled monthly consumption of 200 thousand tons had to be continuously reduced, reaching 24 thousand tons only at the beginning of 1943. Inevitably, for this reason ship movements were constrained.\u00a0\u00a0Mussolini should have taken seriously this factor into account, before ordering his Navy to attack the Naval Force that was controlling the gates of the\u00a0Mediterranean.<\/p>\n

In addition to the above two very serious problems, they were also some technical shortcomings disadvantaged the Italian ships compared to the British.\u00a0\u00a0The Italians had no radars during the whole war period and their submarine listening equipment was much inferior to those of the British.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, as it became apparent by the evolution of the war operations, training of the Italian naval personnel was lagging.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the complete lack of preparation for night battle was amazing.<\/p>\n

Another point worth examining is the whole hierarchical structure of the Italian Navy and the weak points that it entailed.\u00a0\u00a0Contrary to the freedom of operations that the British Commander in Chief of the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0disposed, the Italian Chiefs disposed reduced possibility of initiative and the direction of operations was in a great extent concentrated in the hands of the\u00a0Supermarina,\u00a0<\/strong>based in the Ministry of the Navy.\u00a0\u00a0The Chiefs at sea had only the tactical command of the operations, while the strategic directions, the drawing up of the plans and the disposal and deployment of the forces belonged to the Supreme Command of the Navy at the Centre.\u00a0\u00a0The result was that the heads of the naval forces, feeling that the Supermarina was behind them, often waited or were asking for orders, even in cases where they could have acted at their own initiative.<\/p>\n

An\u00a0important\u00a0weakness\u00a0of\u00a0such an\u00a0organization, that all Navies similarly organized should be aware of, is the following.\u00a0\u00a0The Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, head of the Supermarina, was also acting as Deputy Minister of the Navy and had also the responsibility of the administrative services of the Ministry of the Navy.\u00a0\u00a0Under the weight of so much work he was obliged to delegate the direction of operations to his deputy, who was usually the only person knowing the details of the situation but whose initiative was necessarily limited.\u00a0\u00a0This arrangement created another absurdity.\u00a0\u00a0Because Mussolini, as Supreme Commander of the armed forces, had a very limited understanding of naval matters it was necessary that the representative of the Navy with whom he discussed to be completely aware of the details. Mussolini\u2019s interlocutor was the Chief of the General Staff of the Navy and therefore they conferred without the presence of the officer that really directed the naval operations.<\/p>\n

In the beginning of April 1940, Mussolini informed his Chiefs of Staff of his intention to declare war at a time he would consider appropriate.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time he informed them that the war would be defensive on the land fronts and offensive at sea and air.<\/p>\n

\"\"Admiral Cavagnari<\/span><\/b>, the Italian Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, presented in a report that under the prevailing conditions the Navy could not undertake an offensive war.\u00a0\u00a0He added that, in his personal opinion,\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0shouldn\u2019t enter the war if she were to be limited to defence. Mussolini, fearing that the war would end soon without\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0taking advantage of it, disregarded this sound comment.\u00a0\u00a0The Italian dictator had the fixed idea that the war would last no more than 3 months.\u00a0\u00a0He agreed that the Navy should act according to the pre-existing plans, based on the following general directions:<\/span><\/p>\n

The naval forces would always remain concentrated in order to obtain maximum offensive and defensive power.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, they wouldn\u2019t participate in convoy protection missions, except in exceptional and rare occasions.\u00a0\u00a0The Navy was unable to undertake the supply of\u00a0Libya\u00a0and had to be abandoned, to avoid confrontation with the French.\u00a0\u00a0This point of view was accepted, as it was believed that the supplies of\u00a0Libya\u00a0could last 6 months while the war would be of shorter duration.<\/p>\n

When the moment of truth came, the Navy was obliged to act in a completely different way than planned.\u00a0\u00a0Immediately after the beginning of hostilities, the urgent transportation of necessary supplies was ordered.\u00a0\u00a0Progressively, after the capitulation of\u00a0France, the supply missions to\u00a0Libya\u00a0became the main mission of the Italian Navy and as a result its forces were dispersed.<\/p>\n

In the beginning of the war the Italian ships were mainly earmarked to\u00a0Napoli\u00a0and\u00a0Taranto\u00a0and few cruisers in ports of\u00a0Sicily.\u00a0\u00a0In the bases of\u00a0Northern Tirrenia\u00a0only submarines and torpedo boats remained.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The interior\u00a0sea\u00a0of\u00a0Adriatica\u00a0was secured strategically from the\u00a0Taranto\u00a0base.\u00a0\u00a0Light naval forces were based in the advanced bases of Tobruk in\u00a0ibya\u00a0and Leros in the\u00a0Dodecanese.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, at the war outbreak, old submarines, destroyers and torpedo boats based were isolated in Massaoua base, in the\u00a0Red Sea. With this deployment the main forces of the Fleet were concentrated around the centre of the\u00a0Mediterranean\u00a0and the remaining was in positions in the periphery with mainly defensive objective.<\/p>\n

From the above we can deduct that the action plan of the Italian Navy at the time the war was declared didn\u2019t provide for an attack strategy and that the Supermarina considered that there wasn\u2019t any such capability.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, at that precise time, when the attack Fleet had only two battleships in service and\u00a0France\u00a0was still in war, the avoidance of battle in array was absolutely justified.\u00a0\u00a0Any other way to harass the enemy was of course within the operating capabilities of the Italian Navy.<\/p>\n

The battle avoidance strategy cannot be justified however in later periods, when conditions and enemy forces balance were very different.<\/p>\n

From the comparison of the opinions of the two sides, a curious situation is evident.\u00a0\u00a0At the very moment that Admiral Cunningham had reservations concerning the request of the British Admiralty for the detachment of forces to be used for the interruption of Italian transports to North Africa [see:\u00a0\u201cThe British Fleet of the Mediterranean\u201d<\/em>\u00a0<\/a>], the Italians considered that they didn\u2019t dispose the means to protect convoys and were abandoning the idea to re-supply Libya.\u00a0\u00a0Maybe the British were overestimating in that period the naval might of\u00a0Italy.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3172,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3542","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945"],"yoast_head":"\n1.2 The Italian Navy - 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