{"id":3534,"date":"2021-04-20T20:40:24","date_gmt":"2021-04-20T20:40:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/uncategorized\/1-1-o-bretanikos-stolos-tis-mesogeiou\/"},"modified":"2021-06-24T18:30:30","modified_gmt":"2021-06-24T18:30:30","slug":"1-1-o-bretanikos-stolos-tis-mesogeiou","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/1-1-o-bretanikos-stolos-tis-mesogeiou\/","title":{"rendered":"1.1 The British Fleet of the Mediterranean"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cWhen in June 1939 Admiral\u00a0Andrew<\/b><\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>Cunningham\u00a0<\/span><\/b>was taking over as Commander in Chief (C.I.C.), the Mediterranean Fleet was composed of 4 battleships, 7 cruisers, 1 airplane carrier, 3 destroyer fleets, one submarine fleet and one torpedo boat fleet.\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>\u00a0was already the main base of the Fleet, but with many shortcomings to successfully face her mission.\u00a0\u00a0The repairs means and ship docking facilities were completely insufficient, the antiaircraft defense was feeble and an airport for the naval air force was scheduled but not yet built.<\/span><\/p>\n

At that time, the prevailing opinion in the political circles in\u00a0<\/span>London<\/span>\u00a0was that if\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0were to join the war, she would be easily been neutralized.\u00a0\u00a0However, as there were not enough land forces available and as\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0wouldn\u2019t capitulate with air bombardments only, it was on the Navy that they mainly counted on.<\/span><\/p>\n

These political circles expected on one hand that with intensive bombardments from the sea of ports and cities on the coastline the morale of the Italian people would be shattered, even if the Navy would thus suffer heavy losses from the enemy submarines, air force and minefields.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, thanks to the naval blockade, naval transports of\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0to and from her forces outside the mainland and her supply sea routes would be interrupted.\u00a0\u00a0In addition there was a perception that by simply seizing\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>, the\u00a0<\/span>Italian East Africa<\/span>\u00a0would fall and\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0would be defeated.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Commander in Chief of the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0was of the opinion that the military seizure of\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>\u00a0wasn\u2019t necessary and that the complete interruption of\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u2019s naval transports in combination with bombardments of the Italian coastline by the Fleet would suffice.\u00a0\u00a0He considered that the available then British naval forces in the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>, that were expected to be reinforced by the French, were sufficient to reach these objectives if some shortcomings were covered.\u00a0\u00a0A relative important number of reconnaissance planes were mainly needed to secure \u2013 to a certain degree \u2013 the surveillance of\u00a0<\/span>Eastern Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0and the reinforcement of the antiaircraft defense of\u00a0<\/span>Malta<\/span>, destined to be used as advanced base.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Admiral Cunningham disagreed with the point of view advanced by some military analysts that the battleships should be safeguarded for an eventual future use against the Japanese.\u00a0\u00a0These ships should be used to bombard the Italian coastline and this way eventually the Italian Fleet would be obliged to fight, as was the Admiral\u2019s wish.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, as the\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>\u00a0naval base didn\u2019t dispose sufficient antiaircraft and antisubmarine defenses, the ships were eventually safer at sea than in the harbor.<\/span><\/p>\n

After the declaration of war with\u00a0<\/span>Germany<\/span>, on\u00a0<\/span>September 3, 1939<\/span>, it became evident that\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0was not planning to enter the war any time soon.\u00a0\u00a0Thus it was decided that the presence in the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0of important naval forces was not contributing to the war effort.\u00a0\u00a0The surveillance of the\u00a0<\/span>Gibraltar<\/span>\u00a0straits would be enough in order to hinder the sailing in of German submarines. This objective was of course not achieved when the war was raging in the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Thus, progressively, most naval forces left the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0up to the point that by the end of 1939 only 3 light cruisers and a few Australian destroyers remained in the Fleet.\u00a0\u00a0Then, from May 1940, the Mediterranean fleet started being reinforced, because of the doubtful position of\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0In the mean time the French had informed of their intention to keep in the Mediterranean 2 heavy cruisers and a few cruisers, some destroyers in\u00a0<\/span>Mers-El-Kebir<\/span>,\u00a0<\/span>Algeria<\/span>\u00a0and 4 heavy cruisers and some destroyers in\u00a0<\/span>Toulon<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0These promises were realized and at some point in time most ships in\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>\u00a0were French.<\/span><\/p>\n

While the naval forces of the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0were continuously reinforced, the other shortcomings and especially the most serious that concerned the reconnaissance aviation were not covered.\u00a0\u00a0For long distance reconnaissance only a few flying boats were available in\u00a0<\/span>Malta<\/span>\u00a0and in\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0They were perfect to fulfill their objective, on condition that there was no reaction from enemy air force.<\/span><\/p>\n

In case of an Italian attack against\u00a0<\/span>Greece<\/span>, the seizure of Souda bay in\u00a0<\/span>Crete<\/span>\u00a0was under consideration, because of her great importance for the refueling of light ships.\u00a0\u00a0For such a case British and French troops would be made available.\u00a0\u00a0In preparation of this operation, 4 French cruisers had already sailed from\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>\u00a0to\u00a0<\/span>Beirut<\/span>\u00a0to take aboard French troops.<\/span><\/p>\n

The first important difference of opinion between the C.I.C. of the Mediterranean Fleet and the Admiralty, assumingly acting under the pressure of the British Prime Minister, erupted in June 1940.<\/span><\/p>\n

When Admiral Cunningham was asked to report on his plan of operations, he informed that his initial objective was to secure the transport routes in\u00a0<\/span>Eastern Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0and the\u00a0<\/span>Aegean<\/span>, to interrupt the enemy supplies in the\u00a0<\/span>Dodecanese<\/span>\u00a0and to execute a sweep with heavy ships in\u00a0<\/span>Central Mediterranean<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0He considered that the interruption of supplies in the\u00a0<\/span>Dodecanese<\/span>\u00a0was imposed because, if there was hope that\u00a0<\/span>Turkey<\/span>\u00a0would fight by the side of the British, the Italian naval forces operating there had to be neutralized.\u00a0\u00a0In this rather limited objective, the interruption of the Italian transports with\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>\u00a0was not included, as there were not available sufficient light ships and airplanes and as a military attack of the British against\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>\u00a0was not then an option.\u00a0\u00a0As the Admiral explained, the main force of the Italian Fleet was not an issue for him in order to sweep the\u00a0<\/span>Central Mediterranean<\/span>, despite the fact that available intelligence was not clear if the enemy disposed 3 or 7 battleships.\u00a0\u00a0In reality, as we will see later, when\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0entered the war, the truly ready for war battleships were only two.\u00a0\u00a0The Admiral considered that if the Italian Fleet accepted to fight, the naval forces available in\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>\u00a0were able to confront her successfully.\u00a0\u00a0If on the other hand the Italian ships decided to maneuver and avoid confrontation, the British battleships being slower had very few chances to catch them up.\u00a0\u00a0It was of course sure that if the British Fleet entered the\u00a0<\/span>Central Mediterranean<\/span>, she would have to face serious dangers from enemy submarines and airplanes.<\/span><\/p>\n

When Admiral Cunningham was maintaining the above, he was depending on British forces only, as he didn\u2019t know that the fall of\u00a0<\/span>France<\/span>\u00a0was imminent.\u00a0\u00a0The British Admiralty disagreed with his plan, considering that the proposed strategy was defensive.\u00a0\u00a0However, the evolution of the war operations proved the degree to which an offensive spirit that only his auto-restraint could contain drove the British C.I.C.<\/span><\/p>\n

This case brings to mind a similar situation during the Greek- Italian war. Some military\u00a0<\/span>authorities and several persons who remained behind the front completely ignored the capabilities of our Navy and accused our Fleet for limiting its operations into securing transports in the Greek Seas and of being unable to interrupt the Italian transports to Albania.\u00a0[See:\u00a0\u201cThe Italian attack – New Days of glory Part B: November 1940-\u00a0March 1941<\/i><\/a><\/span>\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/i>].\u00a0\u00a0In addition, conditions in the\u00a0<\/span>Adriatic<\/span>, with the enemy naval and air force bases in close vicinity, were much more difficult from those that the British Fleet was facing in the\u00a0<\/span>Central Mediterranean<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The difference of opinion with the Admiralty was finally settled after the explanations given by the C.I.C. of the Mediterranean Fleet.\u00a0\u00a0His first action would be the seizing of Souda bay in\u00a0<\/span>Crete<\/span>, assuming of course\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0would attack\u00a0<\/span>Greece<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0He would install submarine patrols in the\u00a0<\/span>Greek<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Seas<\/span>\u00a0and along critical points of the Italian coastline, where the submarines would lay mines.\u00a0\u00a0In case the Souda bay operation wasn\u2019t undertaken then, fatefully, the British Fleet operations would depend on the Italian\u2019s.\u00a0\u00a0A powerful naval force would meet any enemy action against\u00a0<\/span>Malta<\/span>\u00a0or elsewhere.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time the Fleet would proceed to sweeping operations towards the Dodecanese and Northern Africa and enemy submarines would be chased south of Crete and at the Eastern and Western straits of the island.\u00a0\u00a0The assault against the Italian transport routes with\u00a0<\/span>Libya<\/span>\u00a0could be assigned to a joint force of cruisers and destroyers, under the condition that the air reconnaissance of the region could be secured.\u00a0\u00a0He stressed however that in case all of the above missions were undertaken, an insufficient force of destroyers would remain available to provide sufficient antisubmarine protection to the battle Fleet, in case of simultaneous operation of all ships.<\/span><\/p>\n

To this indirect request for reinforcement with additional destroyers, the Admiralty replied unable to satisfy.\u00a0\u00a0Destroyers were in short supply because since the beginning of war against\u00a0<\/span>Germany<\/span>\u00a022 were sunk and many more had suffered damages and were undergoing repairs.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The British Navy was suffering of many other shortcomings. The number of available escorts and of light forces in general was quite insufficient to cover needs.\u00a0\u00a0The old battleships compared poorly to the modern ones of other Powers, especially in speed and antiaircraft protection.\u00a0\u00a0Possessing aircraft carriers was an important advantage for the British Navy, however many more were needed for serving efficiently all fronts.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0more specifically, besides the insufficient number of reconnaissance planes and light units \u2013 to which we have already referred \u2013 several kinds of war materials were missing.\u00a0\u00a0They were not enough ammunition and for the defense of the\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>\u00a0base many more antiaircraft guns were needed.\u00a0\u00a0In case sailing through the\u00a0<\/span>Mediterranean<\/span>\u00a0became impossible, the re-supply of the Fleet by the circumnavigation of\u00a0<\/span>South Africa<\/span>\u00a0would become quite problematic.<\/span><\/p>\n

One of the most serious problems was the almost complete absence of antiaircraft protection of\u00a0<\/span>Malta<\/span>, precious as advanced base of light ships and airplanes and for her vast naval base installations.<\/span><\/p>\n

In spite of the above shortcomings, when\u00a0<\/span>Italy<\/span>\u00a0declared war on\u00a0<\/span>June 10,1940<\/span>, the Alexandria Fleet disposed an impressive force.\u00a0\u00a0It consisted of 4 battleships (Warspite,\u00a0<\/span>Malaya<\/span>, Royal Sovereign, Ramillies), an\u00a0<\/span>aircraft<\/span>\u00a0carrier (Eagle), 9 cruisers and about 25 destroyers and 12 submarines. On the other hand the French force in\u00a0<\/span>Alexandria<\/span>\u00a0consisted of the battleship\u00a0<\/span>Lorraine<\/span>, 4 cruisers and 3 destroyers.\u00a0\u00a0Unfortunately, the cooperation with the French ships didn\u2019t last long because it was interrupted by the capitulation of\u00a0<\/span>France<\/span>\u00a0on\u00a0<\/span>March 24, 1940<\/span>.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n

\"\"H.M.S. WARSPITE R.N.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"H.M.S. EAGLE R.N.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3172,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3534","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945"],"yoast_head":"\n1.1 The British Fleet of the Mediterranean - \u039d\u0391\u03a5\u0391\u03a1\u03a7\u039f\u03a3 \u0393\u03a1\u0397\u0393\u039f\u03a1\u0399\u039f\u03a3 \u039c\u0395\u0396\u0395\u0392\u0399\u03a1\u0397\u03a3<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.mezeviris.gr\/en\/the-naval-war-of-the-mediterranean-1939-1945\/1-1-o-bretanikos-stolos-tis-mesogeiou\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"1.1 The British Fleet of the Mediterranean - 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